Saturday
Friday
Thursday
CounterPunch: "America's Best Political Newsletter": "These people are not terrorists or insurgents; they are not uniformed military or intelligence personnel. They are simply people trying to tell it like it is in an environment plagued by censorship"
School Radio Stations Face Competition Over Licenses - New York Times: "A loophole in commission regulations makes educational stations unusually vulnerable to takeover attempts."
The Village Voice: The Bush Beat: "Dick Cheney is so smug that he thinks he can set the agenda for America's news media. Unfortunately, he's right."
Wednesday
Tuesday
McKinney: Republicans seek to silence dissent on Iraq war: "The US invasion and occupation has destabilized Iraq and Iraq will only return to stability once this occupation ends"
Monday
EWG Issues || PFCs: Teflon Pollution from perfluoronated chemicals PFOA PFOS: "Former DuPont Top Expert: Company Knew, Covered Up Pollution of Americans' Blood for 18 Years"
How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball' - Los Angeles Times: "U.S. bungling in the Curveball case was worse than official reports have disclosed.
The White House, for example, ignored evidence gathered by United Nations weapons inspectors shortly before the war that disproved Curveball's account. Bush and his aides issued increasingly dire warnings about Iraq's biological weapons before the war even though intelligence from Curveball had not changed in two years.
At the Central Intelligence Agency, officials embraced Curveball's account even though they could not confirm it or interview him until a year after the invasion. They ignored multiple warnings about his reliability before the war, punished in-house critics who provided proof that he had lied and refused to admit error until May 2004, 14 months after the invasion. "
The White House, for example, ignored evidence gathered by United Nations weapons inspectors shortly before the war that disproved Curveball's account. Bush and his aides issued increasingly dire warnings about Iraq's biological weapons before the war even though intelligence from Curveball had not changed in two years.
At the Central Intelligence Agency, officials embraced Curveball's account even though they could not confirm it or interview him until a year after the invasion. They ignored multiple warnings about his reliability before the war, punished in-house critics who provided proof that he had lied and refused to admit error until May 2004, 14 months after the invasion. "
Sunday
What I Knew Before the Invasion: by Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2001 and 2002
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